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We analyze the effect of different legislature size on per capita regional expenditure in Italy. 
According to the theory, legislature size has an indefinite effect on government spending 
because logrolling and transaction costs may have canceling effects. We find a large and 
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1.  Introduction 
  The economic theory of government has modeled fiscal policy in democratic 
regimes as the result of competition between different pressure groups. One class of 
models developed in this line of research has investigated the relationship between 
government expenditure and legislature size (Weingast et al., 1981; McCormick and 
Tollison, 1981). According to this literature, legislatures may be designed to increase 
the gains from trade between representatives.  
In this paper we build upon this body of research to explore further the positive 
content of the economic approach to politics. Specifically, we test the effect of the 
number of regional legislators on regional government expenditure in Italy from 1980 to 
2000. Two parallel processes have occurred in the Italian administrative regions in the 
last few years. First, the regions have been invested with the power to write their own 
constitutions (Statutes), which policy makers have used to expand the legislature. 
Second, an important process of devolution of tax rates has occurred. As these processes 
of regional institutional and fiscal reform are still in progress, this paper aims to 
highlight some indications on how important legislative structure is to explain spending 
behavior in Italian regions. This may be relevant in an evaluation of ongoing changes 
and to gain a picture of the new institutional setting of these jurisdictions. 
The rest of the paper is organized as follows: Section 2 illustrates the reform that 
has taken place in the institutional structure of the Italian regions over the last few 
years; Section 3 reviews the literature. In Section 4 we develop a theoretical and 
empirical framework for the analysis. We then present the results in Section 5, and 




2. The theoretical and empirical background  
 
The literature on the link between government expenditure and legislature size is 
based on two theoretical approaches. Though both approaches reflect a vision of public 
sector decision-making based on the role of the interest groups and of the logrolling, 
they present some differences. The following section attempts to underlines such 
differences in order to select the theoretical model that appears the most appropriate to 
interpret the Italian regional political and institutional framework.  
An earlier strand of literature is based on the interest groups theory of 
government. This approach explores the decision making process as a brokerage process 
among legislators and lobbyists, in which the characteristics of the brokerage market 
(e.g., the size of legislatures) are an important feature of the analysis. Within this line of 
research, that begins with the seminal contribution by Stigler (1976), McCormick and 
Tollison (1981) – henceforth MTC –  formalize a theory of the lobbying behavior of the 
interest groups in the pursuit of wealth transfers. The organized interest group must 
decide how much to spend on buying legislative influence and how to allocate this 
budget across the two houses of the legislature in order to maximize the organization’s 
return from legislative influence. Larger legislature size (defined as the sum of the lower 
and upper houses) has an indefinite effect on government spending. On the one hand, an 
increase in the number of legislators results in a lower cost of lobbying because of 
additional competition between vote suppliers (legislators). Furthermore, when the total 
number of legislators increases, there are potential gains from increased specialization 
of labor within the committee apparatus. On the other hand, as long as the number of  
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legislators increases, the transaction costs needed to find a viable majority of votes are 
also increased.  
  Within this theoretical framework, Crain (1979) highlights that the link between 
legislative output, which is used to capture the full scope of governmental activity, and 
the size of a legislature is not predictable a priori. A larger legislature could be 
associated either with higher production costs required for assembling legislative 
majorities or, alternatively, with lower decision making costs if the returns from 
increased labor specialization in the committee apparatus dominate the effect of larger 
sized groups on decision making costs. The results are ambiguous: the absolute size of a 
legislature should reduce output rates if the effect of larger-group sizes on the decision 
making costs dominate the returns from increased labor specialization, but should 
increase output rates if the reverse is true.  
  Given the emphasis these models assign to both the costs the interest groups face 
to monitor legislators and the costs for legislators of obtaining a winning coalition (or 
the potential gains from increased specialization of labor in the committee apparatus), it 
turns out that  the relation between government spending and legislative size is 
essentially an empirical question whose answer depends upon the relative strength of 
the different costs of generating collective decisions. Empirical tests of the theory 
outlined in MCT (1981) and in Crain (1979) yield mixed results on the effect of larger 
legislatures on government expenditure (or legislative output) (Crain, 1979; Shughart 
and Tollison, 1986). 
  Another way to explore the government expenditure-legislature size nexus is 
given by Weingast, Shepsle and Johnsen (1981) – henceforth WSJ. They provide a 
formal model on the size of legislatures that focuses on the common pool problem and  
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the related over-sized distributive projects. Founding the logic of the model on the point 
of view of the policy maker (legislator), WSJ build upon the role of the interests of a 
specific geographic constituency and of the logrolling. In particular, the model stresses 
the division of democratic polities into electoral districts, noting that democratic 
representation everywhere is based on “a districting mechanism that divides the 
economy into n disjoint political units called districts” (p. 643), and defining 
“distributive policy [as] a political decision that concentrates benefits in a specific 
geographic constituency and finances expenditures through generalized taxation” (p. 
644). Given these definitions, and assuming legislators follow logrolling, the main 
testable restriction of this model is that government spending increases as the number of 
legislative districts increases. To summarize, let Bi(x) represent the present value of the 
economic benefits which flow from the spending x in district i to the constituents of 
legislator i, such that B' > 0, B" < 0. Let C(x) be the total economic costs of the project, 
under the assumption that C' > 0, C" ≥  0. The efficient benchmark project size is given 
simply by: Max E(x) = B(x) – C(x). Therefore, the efficient level of spending is such 
that Bi' (x)= Ci'(x). If there are n districts and taxes are spread evenly across the districts, 
the legislator i bears (1/n)
th of the cost of spending in district i. Therefore, legislator i 
pushes (x) up to the point in which Bi' (x) = (1/n) Ci'(x). This implies that the optimal 
level of spending for each legislator is increasing in n. If legislators logroll and defer to 
each other regarding such expenditure, then the total spending is increasing in n. This 
implication, called “the Law of 1/n”, has stimulated empirical contributions (Gilligan 
and Matsusaka, 1995; Bradbury and Crain, 2001) that generally support the positive 
relationship between public expenditure and the number of legislators (districts) the 
WSJ model predicts.   
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  The WSJ model and the related empirical literature that builds upon it, are based 
on the implicit hypothesis that one district may elect one representative. This is 
particularly appropriate to interpret the American electoral system, which is a plurality 
system. However, this is not the case of the Italian Regions. As outlined in the previous 
section, the electoral system of the Italian Regions switched from a pure proportional to 
a mix of majoritarian and proportional system; but each district elects a number of 
representatives. Furthermore, while the number of legislators increased, the number of 
the electoral districts remained the same. On the light of these considerations our test 
cannot take WSJ’s model as the basis for the empirical analysis.  
The theoretical hypothesis that will be tested in this paper is therefore those 
outlined in MCT; this implies that we do not have any a priori on the sign of the 
legislature size variable, as this sign indicates which kind of costs associated with the 
approval of expenditure projects will prevail. 
 
3.  A closer look at Italian regional government  
Municipalities, Provinces, Metropolitan Areas, Regions and the State constitute 
the Italian Republic. The autonomy of these jurisdictions is an important feature of the 
Italian political and institutional system. The 1948 Constitution  states that the regions, 
provinces and municipalities are autonomous entities, with their own Statutes, powers 
and functions (art. 114). The regions of Friuli Venezia Giulia, Sardinia, Sicily, Trentino-
Alto Adige and Valle d’Aosta enjoy particular forms of autonomy, according to their 
special Statutes adopted by constitutional law. Furthermore, the Trentino-Alto Adige 
region encompasses the Autonomous Provinces of Trento and Bolzano (art. 116).   
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The Constitution also establishes the regional branches of government, which 
are the Council, the Cabinet and its President. While the Council exercises the 
legislative power granted to the Region and all other functions conferred on it by the 
Constitution and by the laws, the Cabinet is the executive branch of regional 
government (art. 121 Const.). The rules that regulate the functions and the mechanism 
of election or appointment of such bodies of government have changed during the 
period we analyze. Until the reform passed in February 1995, the Council was elected 
under a proportional system and the legislators held office for a 5-year term. The 
number of legislators varied according to the regional population
1 and, in the regions 
with special Statutes, was established by the relevant Statute. The Council appointed the 
Cabinet, which was composed of the President and a certain number of members, 
usually called “assessori”.  
The changes occurred in the political and institutional scenario of the early ‘90s 
and the difficulties in reaching stable governments led to an important reform of the 
regional and local government electoral system. The reform has modified both the 
electoral system and the tenure length of regional legislators. In 1995 the mechanism by 
which the members of the regional Council are elected switched from a pure 
proportional representation system to a mixed one. Specifically, 80 percent of the 
legislators are elected on the basis of provincial lists and the remaining 20 percent by a 
majoritarian system on the basis of regional lists. A top-up number of seats for the 
winning coalition was also introduced, so that the absolute majority of the legislators 
will be held by the coalition linked to the regional list that has obtained the relative 
majority of the votes.
2 Furthermore, the law reduces the tenure length of the Council 
from five to two years if the relationship of confidence between the Council and the  
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Cabinet breaks down during the first two years. The law was first applied in the 1995 
regional elections.  
The process to reform the electoral mechanism ended in 1999 when the art. 122 
was modified by a constitutional law. The renewed version of this article states that the 
President of the regional Cabinet is elected by universal and direct suffrage, unless the 
regional Statute establishes otherwise. The elected President appoints and dismisses the 
members of the regional Cabinet. The first direct election of the President took place in 
the 2000 regional elections. The constitutional law of 1999 also gave  regions the 
opportunity to write their own statutes (art. 123). The statute determines the form of 
government and the fundamental principles of the organization and functioning of the 
Region, in accordance with the Constitution. In other words, the regions can choose 
their own form of government and electoral rules, within some boundaries. In particular, 
they can set the number of legislators. Table 1 reports the old and new number of 
regional legislators according to draft regional constitutions. Twelve out of twenty 
regions plan to increase the number of legislators, in many regions this change has come 
into effect during the regional elections in April 2005.  
 
[Table 1 about here] 
 
  During the period we analyze, the fifteen Regions characterized by the so-called 
ordinary Statute played an active role on the spending side. Yet, this role were not 
exclusive, as the regions exercised their legislative power in compliance with the limits 
set by the national legislature. According to the articles 117 and 119 of the Constitution, 
the expenditure decisions were related to the administration, social services, health care,  
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education and culture, housing, viability and transports, infrastructures and economic 
development. In particular, spending on health care was quantitatively the most 
important item of regional budgets.
3 On the tax side, up to the early 90s regional 
governments did not have neither autonomy nor power to set tax rate, regional revenues 
essentially deriving from grants of central governments.
4 A very limited autonomy was 
introduced in 1992, whereas in 1997 the power to set both the rate of the regional 
business tax (IRAP) and a top up rate of the national income tax was established. This 
process of decentralization was completed in 2001 when a reform of the Section of the 
Constitution devoted to the organization of the sub-national level of governments (Title 
V of the Constitution) was enacted and the degree of financial autonomy of the Italian 
Regions and the attribution of their legislative competences expanded. 
 
4.  Variables and data 
  We use regional data spanning from 1980 to 2000 considering two dataset. The 
first (Large) includes all 20 regions plus the provinces of Bolzano and Trento who 
belong to the Trentino-Alto Adige (TAA) region. Unlike all other Italian regions, for 
historical and ethnic reasons, TAA has very limited power, which is devolved to the two 
provinces. Italian statistics put the two provinces together with the other regions. For 
this reason TAA and its provinces may represent outliers, therefore we also consider a 
smaller dataset (Small) that excludes them and the other special statute regions.  
  The benchmark specification is: 
     
  it it it it it it it REF OR TRANS GDP LEG EXP ε α α α α α α + + + + + + = 5 4 3 2 1 0 , (1) 
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where EXP is regional expenditure, LEG is the number of legislators, GDP is regional 
gross domestic product, TRANS represents transfers from the national government, OR 
indicates the revenue raised by the region itself, REF is a dummy variable meant to 
capture the effect of the reform of 1995 (therefore it is equal to zero before this year and 
equal to one afterwards), and  it ε  is a stochastic error.
7 In the light of the previous 
discussion, we do not have any a priori on the sign of LEG. We also cannot predict the 
sign of REF because the transition from a parliamentarian to a presidential system 
would reduce government spending, but at the same time a process of federalism has 
started inducing regional expenditure to substitute (at least) for national government 
expenditure. All data are in real per capita terms (1995 base = 100), and are expressed 
in euros. Data on expenditure, transfers, and own revenue are taken from Istat (various 
years). GDP and population are taken from Crenos (2004). Table 2 reports the summary 
statistics for the above variables.
8  
 
[Table 2 about here] 
  
Possible endogeneity between expenditure and transfers might affect OLS estimates. 
Transfers affect expenditure, but the reverse might also be true: transfers are set by the 
central government taking into account regional expenditure in order to avoid a drift in 
deficit. In this case OLS estimates may be biased, and the Instrumental Variables 
method provides better estimates. As instruments we used a number of lags of transfers 
equal to the number of variables included in each regression. In the next section we 
presents results obtained with both methods.  
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5.  Results 
  In Table 3 we have estimated eq. (3) excluding regional fixed effects. We did so 
because of the very small variability over time of the size of the legislature in each 
region. The estimates concerning LEG are positive and significant at the 1% level. 
Transfers and institutional reform are also significantly positive. In column (2) we have 
estimated the same model by adding regional fixed effects. The picture changes 
considerably: LEG is now insignificant, whilst GDP becomes significant at the highest 
level. Results for TRANS, OR and REF do not change. The inclusion of fixed effects 
seems appropriate, since the statistics concerning their joint significance (Wald dummy 
– which is distributed as a χ
2 with a number of degrees of freedom equal to the number 
of dummy variables) highly rejects the null. Moreover, the adj-R
2 improves, raising 
from 41% to 85% of the variability in regional expenditure. Taking stock of this result 
we keep regional dummies in column (3) where we remove OR because of possible 
correlation with TRANS. Results are not altered. In column (4) transfers and GDP are 
removed, but OR is still insignificant. Moving to the small sample, we again estimate 
eq. (1) with and without fixed effects, in column (5) and (6), respectively. LEG is highly 
significant in both cases. The Wald dummy statistics again rejects the null, and the 
inclusion of regional dummies increases the adj-R
2 from 62% to 84%. This is probably 
caused by the higher homogeneity in terms of institutional structure of the smaller 
sample, which excludes special status regions. For the other variables that are no serious 
differences with the exceptions of REF, which tend to be insignificant, and OR, which is 
significantly positive in columns (5) and (8) of the small sample. TRANS is probably a 
more important determinant of regional government expenditure than OR because 
monetary transfers play an important role in the policy of cohesion between North and  
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South; regional taxes have not played a major role in regional public finances until the 
last decade. The joint significance of the variables (Wald joint test – which is distributed 
as a χ
2 with a number of degrees of freedom equal to the number of variables) is always 
very high.  
 
[Table 3 about here] 
 
Estimates via the IV method show some differences with the OLS results. The 
coefficients found for LEG are always positive and significant, both in the large and in 
the small sample. Other results are quite similar to previous ones, with the exception of 
TRANS, which is sometimes insignificant. The variable REF is always positive and 
significant, showing that the increasing effect in expenditure caused by federalism 
outweighs the reduction implied by presidentialism. Furthermore, the new system was 
also weak. The regional president was indicated and not directly elected, and after 18 
months from elections could have been removed and the coalition supporting the new 
president could have been different from the previous one (this actually happened in 
two regions, Campania and Calabria). This made the chief executive not very powerful 
with respect to the coalition supporting him. Second, in the transition from the first to 
the second republic the number of parties has increased, making more difficult to reach 
decisions and improving the opportunity for lobbies to be represented.  
 The  χ
2-over id. test maintains that the used instruments are exogenous, only in 
clumn (3) the statistics is borderline insignificant. The joint significance of the variables 
(Wald joint) and of the regional effects (Wald joint) are always very high.  
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[Table 4 about here] 
 
6.  Conclusions 
In this paper we have analyzed the effect of different legislature sizes on 
regional government spending via OLS and IV estimation, to take into account possible 
endogeneity between expenditure and transfers. The results are different across different 
samples, but they have a straightforward interpretation. An increase in the number of 
legislators induces an increase in regional expenditure in the sample of ordinary statute 
regions, pointing towards strong differences with respect to special statute regions. 
Regional expenditure also appears to be linked to the size of national transfers and 
generally to the regional GDP. Revenue raised by regions does not have a serious 
explanatory power. We also find an increase in spending related with institutional 
reform in 1995.  
Our estimates allow us to forecast a significant increase in government spending 
per capita in the regions that are enlarging their legislatures using the window of 
opportunity created by new Statutes. If we express our model in logs, we find that a 
10% increase in legislature size commands on average a 12% increase in per capita 
regional expenditure. This effect is not in line with current attempts to curb government 
spending in Italy, and potentially places the efforts of regional policies in contrast with 
national goals.
9 We believe that this kind of Public Choice analysis should be 




1 The empirical evidence this line of research offers, essentially focuses on the American electoral system, 
which is a plurality system where in each district is elected a single member of legislature. In contrast, 
under proportional system a certain number of representative may be elected in each district.  
2 Bradbury and Crain (2001) also find that the effect is far greater in unicameral legislatures than in 
bicameral legislatures; furthermore, while the size of the lower chamber is positively related to 
government expenditure, the sign of the upper chamber is negative.  
3 On the basis of the law passed in 1968 (n. 108) the number of regional legislators was 30 in regions with 
less than one million inhabitants;  40 for regions with more than one million inhabitants; 50 for regions 
with more than three million inhabitants; 60 for regions with more than four million inhabitants; and, 
finally 80 for regions with more than six million inhabitants. This relationship between regional 
population and legislature size makes possible endogeneity between regional government spending and 
legislature size irrelevant (according to the argument that says that higher government spending needs 
more legislators because of increased specialization).   
4 The number of legislators can be increased if votes do not provide such a majority when translated into 
seats. This is the case of Abruzzo and Calabria in our sample.  
5 In 1998 expenditures on health care, administration and education represented respectively 69.81%, 
6.43% and  1.65% of total expenditures of ordinary statute regions. (Istat, 2000). 
6 In 1991 only 2.5% of regional revenues derived from regional taxes and share of national taxes, while 
97% was from grants from central governments. In 1994 revenues from regional taxes and share of 
national taxes increased, representing 6.3% of the total, whereas grants from central governments 
decreased to 46% (Istat, 2000). 
7 To capture healthcare spending, the major outlay in Italian regions, we experimented the variable 
POP65 (the proportion of citizens aged over 65) but it turned out to be insignificant in all cases, and it has 
been dropped from estimations. This is possibly due to the role of the National Healthcare Fund that 
administered the transfers from the central government to the regions until 2000. 
8 A correlation matrix is available upon request from the authors.  
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9 After writing the first version of this paper there was a heated political discussion about the proliferation 
in most of the regions (typically those who experienced an increase in the number of legislators) of 
committees, with relevant top-up salaries for their chairs. We were not surprised by this effect.    
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Table 1 – Old and new number of legislators 
Regions Old  legislators New  legislators
Abruzzo 43 50
Apulia   60 70
Basilicata 30 40
Calabria 43 54
Campania   60 80
Emilia Romagna  50 65
Friuli Venezia Giulia  60 60
Lazio 60 71
Liguria   40 51
Lombardy 80 80
Marche   40 42
Molise   30 30
Piedmont   60 60
Sardinia   80 80
Sicily 90 90
Tuscany 50 65
Trentino Alto Adige  70 70
Umbria 30 37
Valle d’Aosta  35 35
Veneto 60 60





















Table 2 – Summary statistics 
 Mean S.D. Min  Max
EXP  7,298.653   6,439.811 460.296   33,685.743
GDP 15,300.596 5,365.258 7,247.231    41,199.765
LEG 50.413    17.593 30.000  90.000
OR 449.124 270.72 59.245    536.357
REF 0.286 0.452 0.000  1.000






























Table 3 – OLS estimates 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
LEG  0.226***     
(0.053) 
0.213      
(0.317) 
0.185      
(0.305)  
0.235      
(0.336) 
0.374***     
(0.064) 
0.811***     
(0.181) 
0.795***     
(0.176) 
0.849***     
(0.238) 
GDP 0.099   
(0.271) 
1.038***     
(0.267) 
 1.016***    
(0.263) 
  -0.198     
(0.349) 
0.898***   
(0.249) 
1.116***     
(0.307) 
 
OR  0.021   
(0.065) 
0.006    
(0.045) 
  0.018    
(0.056) 
0.528***     
(0.191) 
0.660      
(0.587) 
  0.434***     
(0.139) 
TRANS  0.302**      
(0.126) 
0.287***     
(0.053) 
0.281***     
(0.052) 
  0.290***     
(0.077) 
0.236***     
(0.057) 





0.644***     
(0.157) 
0.744*      
(0.353) 
0.648*      
(0.324) 
0.283***     
(0.081) 
0.404**      
(0.168) 
0.505    
(0.980) 
0.876     
(0.799) 
1.233*      
(0.710) 
Sample    Large Large Large    Large Small Small Small Small 
Adj-R
2  0.412 0.847 0.845 0.766 0.625 0.843 0  .835  0.7656 
Obs.  370 370 383 372 289 289 289 289 
Wald  joint  31.99*** 50.40*** 49.71*** 16.32*** 40.52*** 85.95*** 89.95*** 30.71*** 
Wald  dummy   120.24***  259.63***  148.5***   118.24***  63.48***  163.17*** 
Numbers in parentheses are robust standard errors. Instruments are a number of lags of transfers equal to the number of variables. *, **, and *** denote significance at 






 Table 4 – IV estimates  
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
LEG  0.213***      
(0.018) 
0.229***     
(0.037) 
0.455***      
(0.038) 
0.411***      
(0.049) 
GDP  -0.144      
(0.153) 




0.633***    
(0.023) 





TRANS  -1.061       
(1.061) 
1.240     
(1.314) 
1.372***       
(0.249) 




0.358**      
(0.156) 
0.245***      
(0.086) 
0.591***       
(0.132) 
0.393***      
(0.107) 
Sample    Large Large Small Small 
Obs.  239 269 202 218 
Wald  joint  67.74*** 56.88*** 43.19*** 72.13*** 
Wald  dummy  33.13*** 50.63*** 78.97*** 56.19*** 
χ
2-over  id. 5.78 5.11 8.33 6.34 
Numbers in parentheses are robust standard errors. Instruments are a number of lags of transfers 
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